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MICRO-FOUNDATIONS OF MONEY AND FINANCE 
1. Money in frictionless general-equilibrium models 
Money and Banking textbooks have litte difficulty explaining the use of 
money. Money facilitates the exchange of goods and the division of 
labour by lowering transaction costs. There is nothing wrong with that 
story, but when it comes to incorporating money in microeconomic gene-
ral-equilibrium models, it proves extremely difficult to explain why 
people would be willing to hold a non-interest-bearing asset whilst 
riskless assets with a positive return are available (time or savings 
deposits) and why the use of such an asset could lower transaction 
costs. All kinds of plausible models have been developed to explain the 
volume of money demanded, but they presuppose an economy where money 
does already exist in the first place. In the textbook story money does 
away with the need for a doublé coincidence of wants for a transaction 
to take place or, in the absence of such a coincidence, with the need 
for a series of transactions. More generally, the use of money reduces 
the transaction costs which a seller incurs in order to find a buyer 
and a buyer incurs in order to find a seller. Those transactions costs 
are predominantly of an informational character: they result from the 
need for communication between prospective buyers and sellers, from 
gathering information on the market and inspection of goods but also 
from the keeping of records and the drawing up of accounts (Niehans 
1969 p, 709). These costs must be distinguished from the minimal costs 
of physically transferring goods from seller to buyer, which should 
really be seen as production costs. 
Walrasian equilibrium models with money are not very satisfactory 
because they provide no reason why goods shouldn't exchange directly 
for other goods (cf. Hahn 1973 p. 23). Arrow-Debreu models, where 
transaction decisions are taken at one moment for all future dates, 
provide no place for money either (cf. Debreu 1959). The Walrasian 
auctioneer who, or the tatonnement mechanism that, regulates the buying 
and selling process ijn these models are devices expressly introduced 
to abstract from information costs, the very rationale of the use of 
money. Patinkin's attempt to integrate monetary and value theory in his 
painstakingly written Money, Interest, and Prices (Patinkin 1965), 
which can be seen as the culmination of the Walrasian tradition, is a 
glaring example of the ultimate futility of introducing money in a 
general-equilibrium model where all goods exchange against all goods. 
Patinkin tries to "conceive of a barter economy as the limiting posi-
tion of a money economy whose nominal quantity of money is made smaller 
and smaller" (Patinkin 1965 p. 75). This attempt was doomed to failure, 
because prices go down in step with the nominal money supply so that 
the real quantity of money is not reduced. Patinkin realised fuil well 
that one cannot compare a barter economy with a monetary economy in 
this way. His argument, however, was that "in a barter economy there is 
obviously neither an excess-demand equation for money nor a dependence 
of commodity excess-demand equations on real balances" (ibidem), which 
would to his mind make a comparison between a barter economy and a 
monetary economy more or less impossible. But a comparison between a 
monetary economy and a frictionless barter economy really serves no 
purpose, even if one adds real balances as an argument to individuals' 
utility functions (Patinkin 1965 Ch. VI, Patinkin and Levhari 1968); 
the only meaningful comparison is with a barter economy where transac-
tions are costly because of the higgling and haggling involved. Patin-
kin neglects the fact that the exchange technology in a monetary eco-
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nomy is more efficiënt than in a barter economy. A given initial supply 
of resources will result in differing amounts of goods and services 
and, in a production economy, in different paths of capital accumula-
tion under the two systems. In monetary growth models, to which Patin-
kin incidentally also contributed, this is taken account of by adding 
real balances as an argument to a macro-economie production function 
(Patinkin and Levhari 1968). Such a procedure may intuitively be more 
appealing than the addition of real balances to utility functions. It 
suffers, however, from the lack of a micro-economie foundation, which 
is hard to supply because markets in those monetary growth models are 
usually frictionless (cf Sijben 1978). Anyway, if macro-economie models 
assume a productive contribution of money balances, micro-economics 
should provide an explanation why this is so. 
2. Money in a single-period model 
A step forward was made by writers who constructed general-equilibrium 
models with transactions costs, prominent amongst them Niehans (1969, 
1971, 1975, 1978 Ch. 6). Niehans (e.g., 1978 p. 101) simply posits that 
there are no IOU's or more generally that there is no credit (with the 
exception of Niehans 1975, but in that article bonds are added to the 
system only in order to explain the rate of interest). This effectively 
precludes triangular trade. Under a Walrasian auctioneer system, A 
could sell goods to B and B goods to C whilst C sells goods to A. In a 
system where transactions are not concluded in an all-embracing single 
decision as in the Walrasian world, A demands a quid pro quo from B 
instead of agreeing to wait for delivery of goods by C. C may have to 
pay C - goods to B, who has no need for them and uses them to pay A. In 
a multi-agent world without a generally accepted medium of exchange 
long chains of transactions may be called for before a preferred redis-
tribution of goods has taken place. If instead some goods, say C -
goods, are used as a medium of exchange, the number of transactions is 
drastically reduced (the medium of exchange may also, but need not, be 
a means of payment: the transfer of a means of payment cancels outstan-
ding claims, it functions as ultimate payment, whilst the transfer of a 
medium of exchange need not in itself cancel a debt; it may only be a 
means for bringing about the transfer of a means of payment, e.g., a 
cheque). 
The reduction in the number of exchange transactions achieved by 
deploying a generally accepted means of payment and the consequent 
reduction in transactions costs is analysed in a model developed by 
Jones (1976). Jones argues that indirect exchange can be cheaper than 
direct barter because fewer search contacts are on average needed 
between prospective sellers and buyers before an exchange is made (see 
for a further development of Jones's model Oh 1989). In contrast to 
transportation, storage and inspection costs, the information costs of 
finding a trading partner may be assumed to be non-additive. Indirect 
exchange may doublé transportation costs, but not information costs, 
over direct barter. Let a supplier of good i enter the market and 
search for a supplier of good j. All agents in the market hold one unit 
of a good and demand one unit of another good. Note that prices are 
given and that the market is assumed to clear eventually at these 
prices. The (subjective) probability that a randomly met trader in the 
market demands good i, or, for that matter, supplies good i, is denoted 
by pt. The probability that he or she supplies good j is denoted by p:. 
The probability that an agent offering good i and demanding good j 
meets another agent who demands good i and supplies good j therefore is 
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p±Pj. The number of search contacts which the agent expects having to 
make before the desired transaction can be made consequently is l/p^j. 
With indirect exchange through the medium of a good n, the expected 
number of search contacts is 1/PiPn + l/pnPj . The expected number of 
contacts, and with it the expected search costs of exchange, is smaller 
with indirect trade than with direct barter if 
i/PlPn + i'PnPj < i'PiPn 
or 
Pi + P j > P n ' 
This may the case for some goods but not for others. Jones's model 
leaves open the possibility of direct barter and indirect exchange 
existing side by side. Note that chains of barter transactions are 
precluded by the assumption of additive transportation and related 
costs• 
The question which good becomes the money commodity is taken up by 
Brunner and Meltzer (1971). In their view, transaction costs are, apart 
from costs of transfer and storage (which can best be seen as produc-
tion costs), in fact costs of acquiring information on assets or, more 
precisely, the costs of identifying qualities of a good, including the 
location and identity of other traders (see also Alchian 1977). Repea-
ted use of some assets and some transaction sequences will lower the 
marginal cost of acquiring information. This means that patterns of 
indirect exchange emerge in which some specific assets are deployed as 
media of exchange. 
The assets used in indirect trade evolve into money. Their 
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function is to enable individual agents not to balance the value of 
sales and the value of purchases at every moment of time. In the 
absence of a Walrasian auctioneer, money enables agents to demand goods 
without being certain of the quantities they will be able to sell and 
the prices at which they will sell. In a timeless Walrasian economy it 
may be somewhat difficult to imagine repeated use of assets and, conse-
quently, of learning processes, but time could be thought of as consis-
ting of periods within which all purchases of goods and services are 
paid for by payments of goods and services. This implies that money 
must either be a good that ends up as a producer or consumer good with 
an economie agent at the end of each period, or a claim to such goods, 
or that it is credit-money that is destroyed when all claims are sett-
led at the end of each period. Goods and services are ultimately paid 
for by goods and services. In terms of Niehans's example, C could pay A 
by transferring a claim in the books of a financial institution, a 
bank, to A against the creation of a debt to the bank. A would transfer 
the claim to B against receipt of B-goods and finally B transfers the 
claim to C, af ter which C s claim and C s liability both vanish through 
compensation. This implies that for every individual agent the total 
value of sales (expressed in the numeraire) must equal the total value 
of purchases within any period. Forced sales (in order to make up net 
debit positions at the bank) or forced purchases (in order to get rid 
of a net credit position) are conceivable. With the demise of the 
Walrasian auctioneer, perfect markets are gone too (some models, such 
as Jones's, assume that prices are given to agents, but that is only 
because (in Jones's case) modelling both his central idea of informa-
tion costs as a stochastic variable depending on chance meetings be-
tween prospective trade partners and flexible prices proved an insur-
mountable task). 
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Within self-contained periods of time, it is hard to conceive of 
agents that would wish to hold end-of-period balances of intrinsically 
worthless pieces of paper, or more generally of fiduciary money, rather 
than goods. The holding of fiduciary money, such as bank notes or book 
entries, that is not destroyed at the end of each period only makes 
sense in models of sequence economies. Sequence economies differ not 
only from Walrasian economies where the future does not figure, except 
perhaps in a roundabout way by shaping expectations (and in that way, 
e.g. via inflation expectations, by affecting the rate of interest). 
They also differ frorn Arrow-Debreu economies where all decisions are 
made in one feil swoop at the dawn of (model) time. From then on till 
Kingdom Come nothing happens- but the realisation of plans, if not with 
certainty then with known probabilities. As in Walrasian one-period 
economies, there would be no point in holding money beyond the span of 
time during which contracts are concluded. It would serve no purpose 
after the once-and-for-all decision had been made. In contrast, se-
quence economies require new decisions to be taken and new transactions 
to be made every new time period. It appears that sequence economies 
provide a better setting for analysing the foundations of monetary 
economies than single-period models, as single-period models are hard 
put to explain the continued holding of money. 
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3. Money in a sequence economv 
Niehans (1978, further on in Ch. 6) does not confine himself to a one-
period model but also considers a multi-period situation. Transactions 
and storage costs, again, are simply assumed to exist, with those for 
the money commodity the lowest. An explanation of those costs is not 
given, apart from the suggestion that they are mostly search and infor-
mation costs (Niehans 1978 pp. 63-'3; again, he mies out credit). 
Brunner and Meltzer's analysis on first sight does not take us much 
further, as it leaves one somewhat in the dark about the nature of the 
information sought. A clue is given in a footnote, which says that "If 
there are no costs of acquiring information, differences in the timing 
of receipts and payments are adjusted by issuing verbal promises in ex-
change for goods and, later, delivering goods" (Brunner and Meltzer 
1971 p. 785 nt. 4). Though Brunner and Meltzer's idea was not taken up 
at the time, recent developments follow a similar track. E.g., Gale 
argues that in a world without a complete Arrow-Debreu system of mar-
kets, trading continues after the first date. The value of sales will 
not at every moment in time equal the value of purchases for all ac-
tors. Money holdings then serve to absorb the difference, at which 
point Gale, like Brunner and Meltzer before him, observes that "If 
agents were really trustworthy there would be no need for a sequence of 
budget constraints" (Gale 1982 p. 186, see also pp. 197, 235, 245). Or, 
as Niehans notes, "If one could be perfectly certain that everybody 
always stays within his budget constraint, everybody could be allowed 
to obtain goods without a specific quid pro quo", which would make ex-
change otiose (Niehans 1978 p. 63 nt. 4; as with Brunner and Meltzer, 
the most fundamental observations are relegated to footnotes; see also 
Ostroy 1973 p. 597, Ostroy and Starr 1974 p. 1093). Agents could, in a 
one-period model, issue debt (IOU's) or entries could be made in an 
accounting system in the understanding that after a round of dealings 
the claims would be cancelled (i.e., every agent would both be willing 
and able to meet his or her budget constraint). In a sequence economy, 
A could sell to B at time t and be certain of receiving something in 
return at time t + 1 f rom C (Goodhart 1975 p. 3). Without uncertainty, 
but a known probability distribution of future 'states of the world', 
that is of exogenous circumstances such as the weather, claims on 
contingent commodities can be exchanged. To fix ideas, an order may be 
made for umbrellas to be delivered at a certain date if it rains and 
for parasols if the sun shines (see for an extremely lucid non-techni-
cal exposition of such an Arrow-Debreu economy Meade 1970). 
The point of trustworthiness is also stressed by Illing (1985). 
Even if agents were immortal, there would be no complete Arrow-Debreu 
system of contingent future markets, if only because of moral hazard 
problems which follow from asymmetrie information (Brunner and Meltzer, 
1971 p. 786, also stress the uneven distribution of information between 
buyers and sellers as a reason for seeking alternatives to barter). In 
other words, trade would not only take place at the initial date, but 
there would also be spot markets at future dates. Illing's thought 
experiment runs as follows. Households are at the start of every period 
supplied with endowments of perishable consumption goods. These endow-
ments are risk variables, with a known probability distribution. House-
holds could even out the fluctuations in individual endowments by 
concluding insurance contracts. But there is asymmetrie information. At 
any moment in time, households know their own endowment. Others do not, 
which means that the insurance company has to incur costs to collect 
information on individual endowments. There is, therefore, an incentive 
for households to cheat. It may in these circumstances be advantageous 
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to hold money as a substitute for costly insurance. But why, again, 
money rather than IOU's? Illing here follows Gale: because financial 
assets other than money imply information costs (Illing 1985 pp. 81-
'2). An idea of the information costs involved in actual practice is 
given by the commission paid by retailers to the credit card company 
when payment is made through a credit card, which is a form of credit, 
of course (Gale 1982 p. 187). It should also be obvious that only a 
subset of transactions can be settled in this way, and that only some 
fraction of the set of agents can make use of this kind of credit, 
precisely because of the costs involved. 
It might be objected that a model such as Illing's is far removed 
from reality, but such an objection would be beside the point. The aim 
is to find the essential or minimum requirements for a monetary econo-
my, not to give a realistic description of a monetary economy. It is 
not surprising to find that transaction costs, and, if money is to be 
more than the rather bloodless construct it is doomed to be in a time-
less or a one-period model, a time duration are minimum requirements of 
a monetary economy. It may be thought rather striking, though, that 
uncertainty as to prices or interest rates, which looms large in Key-
nesian money demand functions, is not a precondition. Uncertainty as to 
agents' creditworthiness by contrast does seem to have to be assumed in 
order to explain why money rather than IOU's is used. It has been 
argued that there will only be monetary exchange if there are costs of 
negotiating exchange transactions and if commodities have certain 
physical characteristics, i.e., some commodities have low storage costs 
(Clower 1977), but that begs the question why IOU's could not do the 
job. These last-named conditions may be necessary, but are by no means 
sufficiënt. Variations on the theme of moral hazard could be thought 
of. If contracts, e.g., contracts for the immediate delivery of goods 
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against the future provision of labour services are made, the diffi-
culty arises of ensuring that the work be done well (Halm 1988 p. 971). 
Money is, in the above analysis, useful because it saves on 
transactions costs. More precisely, the use of money saves on the costs 
of acquiring information (in the same vein King and Plosser 1986). The 
crucial characteristic in this connection is the trustworthiness of the 
issuer (Gale 1982 p. 189). Fiduciary money therefore can only be the 
result of a long development. People accept intrinsically worthless 
paper money only because they expect other people to accept it in their 
turn on a later date. Their readiness to accept it can be fostered by 
the government announcing that people may pay taxes in that kind of 
money (cf Starr 1980 p. 262; in line with this approach, De Roos, 1989 
p. 30, proposes to further the use of the Ecu through European govern-
ments doing their spending and collecting their taxes in Ecu's). If 
money were restricted to commodity money, enormous amounts in terms of 
the unit of account would be needed, which would entail high costs in 
terms of resources and would drive up the relative price of the money 
commodity to the detriment of its function as a production or consump-
tion good. 
It seems that a sequence economy not only results from moral hazard, 
but also from the costs of making decisions. In an Arrow-Debreu world, 
where incidentally households are infinitely lived, preparing for all 
possible future 'states of the world' by exchanging claims on contin-
gent commodities would imply an infinite number of decisions. If we 
drop the fiction of a costless Walrasian/Arrow-Debreu auction mecha-
nism, an infinite number of decisions implies infinite costs. Because 
of computational limitations of economie agents, it may be too costly 
to write contingent contracts or resort to insurance (providing, e.g., 
for the untimely death of a labour supplier) (cf Radner 1968 p. 31, 
12 
Hahn 1988 p. 971). It is cheaper then not to decide on all future 
dealings and postpone most decisions to later dates. Besides, even if 
it were conceivable to conclude contingent contracts for all future 
dates and all future 'states of the world', with positive costs of 
concluding contracts it would surely not be welfare-optimising to 
concentrate all efforts at the initial date (Hahn 1985b p. 76). If 
households are not infinitely lived, or if the future is not only risky 
but also uncertain in the sense of Frank Knight, decisions for all 
future dates and all possible 'states of the world' are not even con-
ceivable. Not all factors that make for a sequence economy also explain 
the use of money. Computational limitations would not in all cases 
exclude the use of IOU's if there were no moral hazard problems -
though cases that would be expensive to insure against even without 
moral hazard, such as the untimely death of a prospective supplier of 
future labour, also seem to call for money rather than IOU's. 
The last word has certainly not been said on this subject. There 
is no lack of fine ideas, but to model these ideas is no mean task. One 
thing at least is clear: timeless general-equilibrium models won't do 
if we want to explain not only the use but the holding of money. We 
need models that provide for sequences of trades, as emphasised by 
people such as Gale and Illing. The information costs that may well be 
the key to the use of money also explain its typical characteristics of 
divisibility and liquidity, plus its power to lower transactions costs 
(cf. Gale 1982 pp. 187-'8, 194-'7). 
Having found the minimum requirements of a monetary economy, the 
next step should be to incorporate production in the model and to take 
account of the better specialization made possible by the use of money, 
which means that the endowments in monetary economies differ from those 
in barter economies (cf. Hahn 1973 p. 234). But this poses enormous 
technical problems. On top of that, there seems at present to be no way 
to model the scale economies made possible by the use of money (cf Hahn 
1985a p. 2, Niehans 1969 p. 106). It would be difficult to conceive of 
a Pareto-optimal competitive equilibrium in such a situation, to men-
tion one problem. With scale economies, if internal to firms and house-
holds, pure competition is impossible and with perfect markets gone as 
well, no tidy general-equilibrium model can be applied. 
4. Overlapping-generation models 
Economists associated with the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis in 
particular have made attempts to find the essential characteristics of 
money with the help of overlapping-generation models (Kareken and 
Wallace 1980). In overlapping-generation models, there are at any 
moment in time two generations of people, an older one and a younger 
one. Older people must have saved resources or claims to resources in 
order to survive after retirement. Storing resources over a number of 
decades is a costly affair and society can achieve considerable savings 
if people build up a store of claims to resources instead. Those claims 
could be intrinsically worthless pieces of paper, i.e., fiat money. A 
generation then first works and sells part of its produce to the older 
generation against money and when it in its turn has become the older 
generation it uses up its money treasure and receives consumption goods 
from the then younger generation, and so on (see for an extremely 
formal model, in which the young are at the start endowed with consump-
tion goods and the old with both consumption goods and money, Wallace 
1980). 
Intrinsically worthless fiat money is certainly one means of 
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transferring resources from one generation to another. There seems, 
however, to be no compelling reason why it should be more efficiënt or 
convenient than other means, such as claims to ownership of land which 
has the benefit that the acceptability of the claims by next 
generations 
can hardly be in doubt. It may be asked why commodity money could not 
be used, but that would mean that people store commodities, which the 
use of money was supposed to make otiose in the first place. In a 
multilateral trade world where exchanges are not restricted to inter-
generational transfers (and agents are even taken to be immortal, 
following the Arrow-Debreu convention) money first may take the form of 
commodity money and fiduciary money may gradually come into use as 
trust in its acceptability by other agents grows until at some point in 
time intrinsically worthless fiat (paper) money gains currency. Over-
lapping-generation models restrict the class of exchanges and conse-
quently the possibilities of a medium of exchange to save on transac-
tions costs severely. In fact, transactions costs are conspicuous by 
their absence in these models, because there are no search or other 
information costs, there being only one (consumption) good. In fair-
ness, it must be mentioned that the proponents of this line of attack 
themselves see the assumption of costless communication, i.e., the 
absence of information (transactions) costs, as a major problem. They 
only wonder how such costs can be adequately modelled (Kareken and 
Wallace 1980 p. 9). 
It may be concluded that overlapping-generation models fail to 
capture the medium-of-exchange function of money adequately (cf Ostroy 
1989 ). Money has only a distinct role to play in the world pictured in 
those models if it is fiat money and it is not explained why money can 
exist alongside other claims to commodities, even when agents are 
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immortal or behave as if they are and people trust that money balances 
can be exchanged for goods in the future (cf Tobin 1980 p. 84). 
5. Cash-in-advance models 
Patinkin struggled with the problem of finding a rationale for the use 
of money in a general-equilibrium. Clower attempted to cut the Gordian 
knot that Patinkion failed to untie by simply positing that, in a 
monetary economy, "money buys goods and goods buy money; but goods do 
not buy goods" (Clower 1969 pp. 207-'08). That, though, is not much 
better than adding money as an argument to the utility function, which 
Clower incidentally does too, as it leaves the contribution of money to 
welfare unexplained. In Patinkin's case money is held even if transac-
tions could easily be made without money; Clower sets out to correct 
this situation by putting an arbitrary restriction on the system. For 
it is quite an arbitrary procedure to postulate the use of money in all 
transactions, as is common practice in this kind of models (e.g., Lucas 
1980, Eden 1986). On top of that, there is the restriction that at the 
beginning of any period the total demand for goods, expressed in the 
unit of account, cannot exceed the total volume of money, which exclu-
des purchases paid for by receipts of money against goods and services 
sold during the period under in question (Clower 1969 pp. 208-'09). 
The introduction of money can hardly be shown to have welfare-
increasing effects if a Clower or cash-in-advance restriction is simply 
added to an already existing system of demand and supply equations. 
Nonetheless, if the aim is not to compare barter and monetary economies 
but to explore the effects of the use of a generally accepted medium of 
exchange, the procedure might be of some use. It can be of no more than 
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limited use, though, as an inflexible transactions technology is impo-
sed on the system which leaves no room for, e.g., trade credit as an 
alternative to the generally accepted medium of exchange. Even if the 
capital market is not so perfect as to give borrowers an unlimited 
access to it at constant costs, to exclude trade credit altogether is 
going to the other extreme. 
Lucas (1987 Ch. VI) uses a moderate variant of the cash-in-advance 
procedure in order to introducé both the Tobin portfolio demand and the 
Baumol-Tobin inventory-theoretic demand aspects of money demand in his 
model. He assumes that goods on any day can be bought with money acqui-
red before, e.g., at the securities market, but he provides for the 
possibility of obtaining trade credit. His model is a general-equili-
brium model where the relative price of cash goods (goods paid for in 
cash on the spot) and credit goods (goods to be paid for one period 
later) is exactly equal to one plus the rate of interest. In other 
words, trade credit costs you exactly the same amount of interest as 
selling securities now in order to pay spot and foregoing the interest 
on these securities. IOU'S apparently carry no risk premium in this 
model and the introduction of money can hardly be shown to increase 
welfare, because it does not save on information costs. It is simply 
postulated that agents have specific preferences over cash and credit 
goods. 
6. Financial intermediation 
It turned out that money arises first and foremost because it saves on 
information costs. Financial intermediaries have sprung up for similar 
reasons. If an economie agent needs a big loan, a number of investors 
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will be involved. If every investor separately invested in the produc-
tion of information on the borrower, there would be an enormous du-
plication of costs. Alternatively, there could be a free-rider problem. 
as every investor would try to make use of the information produced by 
another investor, which might even lead to an absence of information 
production (cf Diamond 1984 p. 393). Financial intermediaries speciali-
sing in information production can spare the investors the trouble and 
expense of gathering information themselves. Another service that 
financial intermediaries can provide is monitoring without disclosing 
the information found to a wider public, which firms may demand for 
reasons of competition strategy (Diamond 1984 p. 395). 
If investors delegate information production to financial 
intermediaries, problems of a principal-agent type arise. The financial 
intermediary, acting as the agent of the investors, is inclined to 
spend as little as possible on information production. Again, we run 
into a moral hazard problem. Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1984 p. 417) 
suggest that compensation of each information producer (intermediaries 
in their model being made up of a number of individual information 
producers) should be contingent on some ex post indicator of the 
quality of the information. The market could be trusted, though, to 
provide incentives for intermediaries to give investors reliable 
information: investors that employ successful intermediaries make high 
returns. Such intermediaries build up an intangible asset: a good name; 
and if they want to stay in business it is in their own interest to 
maintain that name. Still, there is a problem here which suggests that 
fixed payments to investors are the optimal arrangement (Diamond 1984 
p. 404). Arrangements that give the investors a fixed payment and 
provide the intermediary with a residual income provide strong 
incentives for intermediaries not to let things slip, whilst minimising 
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the need for investors to monitor the intermediaries. 
Apart from saving on information costs, financial intermediaries 
of course provide investors with the opportunity of spreading risks at 
low transactions costs. Diversification of the intermediary's loan 
portfolio increases the probability that it will be able to pay the 
agreed returns to its investors or depositors. Like the principal-agent 
or moral-hazard problem, this results from market imperfections. 
Participations in or claims on borrowing agents are not infinitely 
divisible, because transaction costs are at least partly independent of 
the amount of the investment. Market imperfections not only explain the 
use of money but also the existence of financial intermediaries. 
7. Conclusions 
It has proved quite a struggle to break loose from the Walras/Arrow-
Debreu world in building monetary models. If money is simply added to a 
frictionless eneral-equilibrium system, it is well-nigh impossible to 
find a rationale for the holding of money. Nothing in terms of the 
consumption set available or the volume of production is gained by 
using money. Walrasian and Arrow-Debreu models do not provide a sa-
tisfactory framework for a meaningful study of money. They provide no 
room for introducing alternative transactions technologies other than 
restrictions on the possible set of transactions that can only be seen 
as arbitrary within the context of those models. General-equilibrium 
models with transactions costs that favour the use of a generally 
accepted medium of exchange, as developed by Niehans, leave unexplained 
what has to be explained first of all. Though this may be a step for-
ward, still the use of money is imposed on the model rather than ex-
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plained from the model (cf Fischer 1988 p. 300), which takes us not 
much further than the inclusion of real balances as an argument in the 
production function or the introduction of a cash-in-advance restric-
tion does. Explanations of the use of money, and of financial interme-
diaries for that matter, by the saving it provides on information costs 
resulting mostly, but not exclusively, from moral hazard look much more 
convincing. 
In single-period models, money is useful because it saves on 
information costs. In sequence models, money of course fulfills the 
same function, but in addition a sharp distinction between money and 
debt (IOU's) can be made there. Money is generally preferred over debt 
to settle transactions. In single-period models, no such distinction 
seems possible because the book entries deployed to keep track of the 
transactions can be viewed as inside money, i.e.., money created against 
IOU's. Outside (fiat) money, which continues to be held by agents after 
claims are settled, can only find a satisfactory place in sequence 
economies. 
Models that assume the use of a generally accepted medium of 
exchange without explaining its use can in principle be useful in 
analysing the effects, if not the causes, of the use of money. Yet, it 
is not clear to what extent, if at all, macromodels should take account 
of the work done in this area (Barro and Fischer 1976 p. 155, Fischer 
1975 p. 158). Postulating a general cash-in-advance restriction, e.g., 
is a rather crude procedure. Possibly less account has to be taken of 
it the smoother the monetary mechanism functions. In cases of poorly 
functioning markets a cash-in-advance restriction might come in useful 
to characterise the working of the system. One problem involves price 
setting, as a monetary economy must do without a Walrasian auctioneer 
and prices are set out of equilibrium (Hentschel 1976 p. 93). 
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Finally, it is worth noticing that the function of money as a 
medium of exchange is really that of an asset that people prefer to 
hold between transactions. The medium-of-exchange quality follows from 
its quality as an asset. This fits in quite well with the Standard 
textbook assertion that money is an asset, namely the asset with the 
highest degree of liquidity (e.g., Ritter and Silber 1970 p. 17). 
Attempts by Hicks (1967) to construe a system with a money lacking the 
asset or store-of-value character therefore were bound to fail. His 
system resembles Niehans's one-period model, with agents who buy before 
they have been able to sell running up a debt with a bank that has to 
be settled before the period ends. Now against agents who buy before 
they sell there are agents who sell before they buy. They are credited 
by the bank and can use their claim on the bank to buy goods and 
services, indeed are obliged to do so. Even if the claims on the bank 
can only be used within one period and cannot be held till a next 
period, they represent purchasing power during that period and 
therefore must be considered assets, i.e., a store of value, if only 
for a restricted period of time. 
It goes without saying (or nearly so) that money and financial 
institutions presuppose imperfect markets, where agents, unlike in a 
Walrasian or Arrow-Debreu world, are not all price-takers and cannot be 
sure of the market accepting or supplying any amount of goods or 
financial instruments at the going price. 
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